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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the hedge fund industry has enjoyed 
remarkable growth.  The media enthusiastically described the success of 
the top-performing funds and the lavish riches they bestowed on their 
employees.1  At the same time, however, there were remarkable stories 
of failure in the industry.2  Both politicians and economists warned of 
the potential dangers hedge funds present to the national and global 
economies.3  These warnings and concerns created a debate regarding 
the level of regulation needed, if any, over what is currently a largely 
unregulated industry.4  This Note argues that while increased regulation 
of the hedge fund industry is necessary, the government’s recent and 
ongoing attempts to increase regulation are misguided.  A self-regulating 
body comprised of the brokers that serve the hedge fund industry is the 
most efficient and effective instrument to limit the most critical risks 
hedge funds present, while still maintaining the numerous benefits hedge 
 1. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, ed., A Billion-Dollar Year for Top Hedge Fund 
Managers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/10/f 
or-top-hedge-fund-earners-it-was-a-very-good-year; No Hedge Against Salary, N.Y. 
POST, Apr. 10, 2007, available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/04102007/business/no_ 
hedge_against_salary_business_.htm. 
 2. See, e.g., Struggling Citigroup Hedge Fund Bars Withdrawals, REUTERS, Feb. 
15, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/fundsFundsNews/idUSN1551782720080215; 
Ann Davis, How Giant Bets on Natural Gas Sank Brash Hedge-Fund Trader, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 19, 2006, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB11586171598036 
6723-search.html; John Spence, Prosecutors Probing Hedge Funds’ Demise: Report, 
MARKETWATCH, Oct. 5, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/prosecutors-
said-probing-bear-stearns/story.aspx?guid=%7BA26FD326-C6F8-42B8-8DD6-7F83B8 
71AE3E%7D. 
 3. See, e.g., Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Christopher 
Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, 
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference: Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (May 
16, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke200 
60516a.htm); Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11200, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/pa 
pers/w11200. 
 4. Recent Cases, Administrative Law–Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking–
District of Columbia Circuit Vacates Securities and Exchange Commission’s “Hedge 
Fund Rule.”–Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006), 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1394, 1396 (2007) [hereinafter Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking]. 
2008 LIQUIDITY AND HEDGE FUNDS 477 
 
funds bring to economies.  Part I provides a general background of the 
hedge fund industry, the current regulatory environment in which hedge 
funds operate, and the risks and shortcomings associated with the 
current regulatory scheme.  Part I also presents the failure of the hedge 
fund Long-Term Capital Management as an example of the risks 
inherent in the present regulatory scheme.  Part II discusses recent 
efforts to increase regulation and offers an alternative solution.  Part III 
examines the potential benefits and limitations of the alternative 
solution. 
I.  THE BENEFITS AND THE RISKS OF HEDGE FUNDS 
The term “hedge fund” generally refers “to an entity that holds a 
pool of securities and perhaps other assets, whose interests are not sold 
in a registered public offering and which is not registered as an 
investment company under the Investment Company Act [of 19405].”6  
A hedge fund’s goal is to provide an absolute return to its investors 
regardless of the overall condition of the securities market.7  Hedge 
funds trade a variety of securities, such as equities, “fixed income 
securities, convertible securities, currencies, exchange-traded futures, 
over-the-counter derivatives, futures contracts, commodity options and 
other non-securities investments.”8
Hedge funds offer many advantages, both to their investors and to 
the securities market as a whole.9  Hedge funds aim to achieve positive 
investment returns without the volatility of traditional investments such 
as stocks and bonds.10  Hedge fund advisers are able to use more 
sophisticated and flexible investment strategies than advisers at entities 
such as mutual funds.11  Hedge funds offer investors the opportunity to 
diversify their portfolios by providing alternative investment vehicles 
 5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006). 
 6. STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH 
OF HEDGE FUNDS 3 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 REPORT].
 7. ROBERT A. JAEGER, ALL ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS 2-3 (2003) (providing a 
comparison to a mutual fund, where the goal of a typical fund is to provide a return to 
the investor that is higher than the related securities market). 
 8. 2003 REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. 
 9. See Daniel K. Liffmann, Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers Under the 
Investment Advisers Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2147, 2158 (2005).
 10. 2003 REPORT, supra note 6, at 4. 
 11. Id. 
478 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
that offer positive returns, while historically showing a low correlation 
to traditional investments in the fixed-income and equity markets.12
In addition to profiting its own investors, hedge funds also benefit 
the general securities market.  Hedge funds help improve efficiency in 
pricing securities in the marketplace.13  Funds may take speculative 
trading positions based on extensive research about the true value or 
future value of a security, and then execute a “short-term trading 
strategy to exploit perceived mispricing of securities.”14  This behavior 
tends to cause the market price of the security to move toward its true 
value.15
Hedge funds also help the overall dispersion of risk in the 
marketplace.16  For example, they often serve as counterparties to 
entities that wish to hedge risk.17  The result is that risk is more properly 
allocated to participants in the financial markets.18  In the case of 
mortgaged-backed securities, for example, the reallocation of risks made 
possible by hedge funds allows for lower mortgage interest rates 
throughout the economy.19  Without hedge funds, the economy would 
experience a higher overall cost of capital.20
Despite its many advantages, hedge funds can also have negative 
effects on the economy.  For instance, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) has noted the potential for hedge fund managers to 
defraud its investors.21  In recent years, hedge fund investors have filed a 
number of lawsuits alleging fraudulent conduct and misrepresentations 
by fund managers.22  Furthermore, some critics argue that hedge funds 
can drive the whole market downward by their use of short-selling 
 12. See id. at 5. 
 13. See id. at 4. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Peter Cook & Scott Lanman, Paulson Says Regulators Should Watch Systemic 
Risk, Investors, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 22, 2007. 
 17. 2003 REPORT, supra note 6, at 4. 
 18. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, 
AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT A-6 (1999), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf [hereinafter 1999 REPORT]. 
 19. See id. at A-7. 
 20. 2003 REPORT, supra note 6, at 5. 
 21. See Regulation of Hedge Funds, supra note 3. 
 22. See, e.g., Complaint, San Diego County Employees Ret. Ass’n v. Maounis, No. 
07 Civ. 2618 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2007). 
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(trades based on the expectation that a security’s price will decline)23 
and present systemic risk through their ability to affect the liquidity of 
the markets.24
Unlike investment vehicles that “buy and hold” securities hoping to 
generate a return in the long run, hedge funds generally follow short-
term investment strategies.25  They take what are designed to be 
temporary positions in stocks or other securities, hoping to unwind them 
in short periods of time.26  Any disruption in the liquidity of the 
securities (or related) markets, therefore, can cause serious disruptions 
for a fund’s positions.27
Market liquidity measures the degree of difficulty in exiting a given 
trading position and the ability to sell a quantity of a security without 
significantly changing the price.28  Hedge funds may analyze and 
undertake market positions based on a different perspective than a more 
traditional historical or macroeconomic analysis.29  These types of 
strategies increase market liquidity because the funds “buy and sell 
assets against prevailing market sentiment with the effect of mitigating 
temporary supply and demand imbalances.”30  A phenomenon dubbed 
“herding” may impair liquidity, however, when multiple hedge funds all 
use the same strategy and “seek to liquidate their positions at the same 
time.”31  For example, many funds invest in futures or other derivative 
contracts that are based on the expected price of a commodity.32  
Unexpected or uncontrollable factors often influence the price of 
 23. See e.g., Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Financial 
Market Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C. 
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 36 (2007).
 24. Chan, supra note 3, at 1. 
 25. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at A-2. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Desmond Eppel, Risky Business: Responding to OTC Derivative Crises, 40 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 677, 688 (2002).
 28. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, THE JOINT FORUM, THE 
MANAGEMENT OF LIQUIDITY RISK IN FINANCIAL GROUPS n.1 (2006), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/joint16.pdf.
 29. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at A-5. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Deloitte’s Financial Services Group, Precautions That Pay Off - Risk 
Management and Valuation Practices in the Global Hedge Fund Industry, MONDAQ, 
May 3, 2007, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=48142.  When a large 
number of hedge fund advisers are using the same strategy, it is referred to as ‘herding’ 
or ‘crowded trades.’ Id. 
 32. See JAEGER, supra note 7, at 153. 
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commodities, causing the expected future price to be very speculative.33  
Often these speculative contracts are traded on markets that have 
significantly fewer participants than stock exchanges.34  Many of these 
participants are hedge funds that can hold very large portions of the 
market by leveraging their positions.35  While this combination of 
leverage and illiquidity in the market creates the potential for high 
returns in good times, when adverse market conditions arise, funds may 
be unable to exit their very large positions (enhanced by leverage).36  In 
other words, hedge funds’ strategies may put them in a position where 
they are unable to sell most or all of their securities without substantially 
affecting the market price.  Because of their leverage, hedge funds 
cannot wait until they can sell at a fair market price.  They must meet 
margin calls from their prime brokers (who extend them credit), and 
therefore they may be forced to sell huge quantities of assets at 
unfavorable prices in an illiquid market.37  These “fire sales” can have 
extremely adverse effects on both market and non-market participants, 
to say nothing of the funds’ investors who stand to see their investments 
decline significantly in value.38
II.  CURRENT REGULATIONS 
The current United States regulatory scheme under which hedge 
funds operate reflects the federal government’s historical belief that it 
has no “interest in regulating advisers that have only a small number of 
clients and whose activities are unlikely to affect national securities 
markets.”39  In other words, the current regulations were designed with 
 33. See Neil Behrmann, Derivatives Trade: Hard to Prepare for the Unexpected, 
BUS. TIMES, May 2, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 8230503; Geithner on Credit 
Innovations, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, May 28, 2007 available at 2007 WLNR 10050556; 
Buffet Warns on Investment ‘Time Bomb’, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2817995.stm.
 34. See JAEGER, supra note 7, at 153. 
 35. See id. at 138. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 42-43 (Random House, 2000). 
 38. See Matthew Goldstein, A Secret Society: Hedge Funds and Their Mysterious 
Success, 6 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 111, 116 (2007).
 39. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-2333, 84 SEC Docket 1032 (Dec. 2, 2004), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2333.htm [hereinafter Hedge Fund Rule]. 
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the assumption that the hedge fund industry as a whole has too small an 
effect on market liquidity to justify significant levels of regulation or 
monitoring.  Recent high-profile failures of hedge funds, however, raise 
the question whether it is necessary to rethink the past wisdom regarding 
hedge fund regulation (or lack thereof).40  The following securities acts 
comprise the regulatory framework in which hedge funds currently 
operate. 
A.  The Securities Act of 1933 
Under the Securities Act of 1933 (“‘33 Act”), anyone who wishes 
to make a public offering of a security must file a registration statement 
with the SEC.41  The ‘33 Act requires the registering entity to provide 
purchasers with a prospectus containing specific information about the 
issuer and the security offered, unless an exemption is available from the 
registration requirement.42  To avoid the registration requirement, many 
hedge funds rely on the private offering exemption in section 4(2) of the 
‘33 Act.43  These funds use Rule 506 of Regulation D to comply with 
the requirements of section 4(2).44  Rule 506 states that funds meet the 
requirements of 4(2) (and are therefore exempt from registration) if they 
refrain from engaging in “general solicitation or advertising” and if they 
make offerings only to “accredited investors,” meaning investors who 
meet certain income and/or net worth requirements.45
 40. See Kevin Carmichael, Paulson Names Panels to Draft Hedge-Fund 
Guidelines, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 25, 2007, available at http://www.bloomberg.co 
m/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ac1R2q8srB08 (discussing Henry Paulson’s 
formation of a committee to draft “best practices” guidelines to curb fears that hedge 
funds, which “have more than tripled in the past decade,” pose a risk to the financial 
system because of their “lack of transparency”). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2006). 
 42. 2003 REPORT, supra note 6, at 13. 
 43. Id. at 14 (exempting any “transactions by an issuer not involving any public 
offering”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 14-16.  “[G]eneral solicitation is not present when there is a pre-existing, 
substantive relationship between an issuer or its broker-dealer, and the offeree.” Id. at 
16.  For hedge funds the relationship must have been established 30 days before the 
investor can make an investment. Id. 
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B.  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“‘34 Act”) is meant to 
protect, inter alia, the efficiency and honesty of the financial markets.46  
Section 15 requires “dealers” to register with the SEC.47  The ‘34 Act 
defines a “dealer” as “a person that is engaged in the business of buying 
and selling securities for its own account.”48  It also distinguishes 
“dealers” from “traders.”49  A trader buys and sells securities, not in the 
course of business, but solely in an individual or trustee capacity.50  
Traders are not required to register with the SEC.51  Entities like hedge 
funds that buy and sell securities for investment generally are considered 
traders rather than dealers, and are therefore not required to register 
under the ‘34 Act.52
C.  The Investment Company Act of 1940 
Most hedge funds have substantial investments that bring them 
within the definition of an “investment company” under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (“‘40 Act”).53  Hedge funds typically rely, 
however, on a statutory exclusion from the definition of “investment 
company,” either § 3(c)(1) or § 3(c)(7), to avoid the regulatory 
provisions of the ‘40 Act.54  Funds tend to choose § 3(c)(7) because it 
permits them to have an unlimited number of “qualified purchasers.”55
 46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ll (2006). 
 47. Id. § 78o. 
 48. 2003 REPORT, supra note 6, at 18. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.
 53. See id. at 11.  Section 3(a)(1)(A) defines investment company as “any issuer 
which is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, 
in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
3(a)(1)(A).  Section 3(a)(1)(C) defines investment company as 
any issuer which is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, 
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire 
investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such 
issuer’s total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an 
unconsolidated basis. 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(C). 
 54. 2003 REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-12.  Section 3(c)(1) excludes from the 
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D.  The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
Almost “all hedge funds’ advisers meet the definition of 
‘investment adviser’ under the [Investment] Advisers Act [of 1940 
(“Advisers Act”)56].”57  All investment advisers must register with the 
SEC and comply with the provisions of the Advisers Act.58  Section 
202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act states that an “investment adviser” is 
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of 
advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as 
to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, 
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as 
part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports 
concerning securities.59
Investment advisers are required to register with the SEC by using 
Form ADV and must keep their information current and provide their 
clients with disclosure statements that include certain information 
provided in Form ADV.60  Among other things, investment advisers 
must disclose to the SEC and to their clients information regarding their 
definition of investment company “any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than 
short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and 
which is not making and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its 
securities.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1).  Section 3(c)(7) excludes from the definition of 
investment company “any issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned 
exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified 
purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that time propose to make a public 
offering of such securities.” 15 § U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(7). 
 55. See 2003 REPORT, supra note 6, at 13. 
 56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006). 
 57. 2003 REPORT, supra note 6, at 20. 
 58. Id. 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11); see also 2003 REPORT, supra note 6, at 20 n.64 
(noting an exception for certain professionals giving advice only about U.S. government 
securities). 
 60. See 17 CFR 275.204-3 (2007).  Advisers use Form ADV not only to register as 
an adviser with the SEC but also for state registration. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Answers to Questions About Form ADV, http://www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2008) (stating that “Part 1 contains information about the adviser’s 
education, business and disciplinary history within the last ten years. . . . Part 2 includes 
information on an adviser’s services, fees, and investment strategies.”). 
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business practices and disciplinary history.61  They must also maintain 
records that are subject to periodic examination by the SEC.62
Although most hedge fund advisers fit the definition of an 
“investment adviser,” many avoid the registration requirements by 
relying on the Advisers Act’s de minimis exemption.63  This exemption, 
found in § 203(b), “excludes from registration investment advisers that 
have had fewer than 15 clients during the preceding 12 months, do not 
hold themselves out generally to the public as an investment adviser and 
are not an investment adviser to a registered investment company.”64  
Under current SEC rules, a “legal organization,” such as a hedge fund, is 
considered a single client.65  Therefore, the rules permit an investment 
adviser to manage up to fourteen hedge funds without having to register 
with the SEC.66
E.  Case Study: Long-Term Capital Management 
Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) was a hedge fund 
founded in 1994.67  It employed a variety of trading strategies, such as 
convergence trading and dynamic hedging.68  From its inception, LTCM 
enjoyed a prominent position in the financial community due to the 
reputation of its principals69 and its large initial capital stake.70  While it 
 61. 2003 REPORT, supra note 6, at 21. 
 62. Id.
 63. Id. (noting that hedge funds are still not exempt from the antifraud provisions 
found in the ’34 Act). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  The SEC changed the definition of a client under § 203(b) in December 
2004. See infra Part II.F.  The new rule was eventually struck down, however, by the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. See id. 
 66. 2003 REPORT, supra note 6, at 21. 
 67. 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at 10. 
 68. Id.  Convergence trading is “the practice of taking offsetting positions in two 
related securities in the hopes that the price gap between the two securities will move in 
a favorable direction.” See id. at 10 n.13.  Dynamic hedging is “the practice of 
managing nonlinear price exposure (i.e., from options) through active rebalancing of 
underlying positions, rather than by arranging offsetting hedges directly.” See id. at 10 
n.14. 
 69. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at xix.  The fund was run by John W. 
Meriwether, a bond trader at Salomon Brothers in the 1980’s and well-known on Wall 
Street. See id.  The fund also boasted many former professors, Ph.D.’s, and two Nobel 
Prize winners. See id. 
 70. Id. 
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managed money for only one hundred investors and employed just under 
two hundred people, LTCM invested in thousands of derivative 
contracts resulting in more than $1 trillion worth of exposure.71
In its early years, LTCM reported stellar returns, ranging from 
approximately forty percent in 1995 and 1996 to slightly less than 
twenty percent in 1997.72  In 1998, LTCM’s balance sheet included over 
$125 billion in assets and a balance-sheet leverage ratio of more than 
twenty-five to one.73  The fund held large positions in several markets; 
in some cases these positions gave the fund ownership positions in 
futures that represented more than ten percent of the open interest in 
foreign futures exchanges.74  Due to LTCM’s vast size, leverage, and 
trading strategies, it became vulnerable during the extreme market 
conditions that followed from the devaluation of Russia’s currency on 
August 17, 1998.75  Russia’s actions, combined with other events that 
destabilized the financial markets,76 sparked a “flight to quality” in 
which investors sought to limit their exposure to risky securities, thereby 
increasing risk spreads and liquidity premiums across the world.77  
LTCM bet heavily that risk spreads would decrease, and therefore began 
to lose millions of dollars by the minute in August 1998.78
With its total equity rapidly dwindling,79 LTCM needed to exit its 
positions quickly, since its potent level of leverage and immense 
position greatly magnified even the smallest change in risk spreads.80  
At this point LTCM desperately needed a cash infusion and was truly 
beginning to feel the pain of illiquidity in the marketplace.81  LTCM’s 
 71. Id. at xviii-xix. 
 72. 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at 11. 
 73. Id. at 12. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 141 (“[M]arkets shuddered from a swelling 
list of negatives: the crisis in Russia, weakness in Asia, Iraq’s refusal to permit full 
weapons inspections, the possibility of China devaluing its currency, and President 
Clinton’s testimony about his relationship with a White House intern, Monica 
Lewinsky.”). 
 77. See id.; 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at 12. 
 78. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 145. 
 79. See id. at 147 (noting that LTCM lost fifteen percent of its capital in one day in 
late August 1998, and that from the end of April 1998 to the end of August 1998, it lost 
more than a third of its equity). 
 80. See id. at 146. 
 81. See id. at 151.
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traders from many geographic areas, including Brazil, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan, all reported that there was no demand for the 
fund’s positions.82  In other words, LTCM was unable to “get out of its 
humongous trades without moving the markets even more.”83  It was 
necessary that LTCM not think about long-term plans,84 but rather 
unwind its 60,000 trading positions in order to free up cash to meet 
margin calls.85  LTCM’s previously flexible credit arrangements grew 
rigid as the fund’s lenders became more contentious with their daily 
mark-to-market valuations for collateral calls.86
By early September 1998, LTCM needed new capital by the end of 
the month or it would no longer survive.87  The fund’s troubles became a 
major concern for many market participants88 who feared that if LTCM 
suddenly collapsed it could devastate the already-fragile world 
markets.89  While seemingly everyone was liquidating their bonds at 
falling prices, LTCM found itself effectively immobilized.90  Due to the 
immense size of LTCM, the sale of even a small fraction of one of its 
large positions would cause the price of the security to plummet and 
would reduce the value of its remaining holdings.91  Compounding 
immobility concerns, LTCM had already lost over sixty percent of its 
capital in September 1998 alone.92
Wall Street banks worried because many of them held the same 
trading positions as LTCM, so any sale of an LTCM position would be 
devastating.93  The banks that traded with LTCM and lent money 
realized it was in their interest to find an alternative solution that would 
 82. See id. at 147-48. 
 83. Id. at 148. 
 84. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 151. 
 85. 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at 11. 
 86. Id. at 12-13; see also LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 156 (“What’s more, many 
of [LTCM’s creditors] were themselves under stress.  This is a timeless irony: when you 
need money most, the most likely sources of it . . . are likely to be hurting as well.”). 
 87. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 165. 
 88. See id. at 164; 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at 13. 
 89. 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at 13; see also Katherine M. Reynolds, U.S. 
Regulators May Limit Bank Loans to Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Dec. 16, 1998 
(noting fears that the LTCM collapse could disrupt international markets). 
 90. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 169. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 181. 
 93. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at 13. 
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cost them less than would a default by LTCM.94  Concerns over an 
LTCM meltdown, however, extended far beyond the fund’s banks.  
According to Alan Greenspan, 
Financial market participants were already unsettled by recent global 
events.  Had the failure of LTCM triggered the seizing up of 
markets, substantial damage could have been inflicted on many 
market participants, including some not directly involved with the 
firm, and could have potentially impaired the economies of many 
nations, including our own.95
Eventually the Federal Reserve Bank of New York became 
involved, and a consortium of banks agreed to invest approximately $3.6 
billion in the fund in return for a ninety percent equity stake in LTCM’s 
portfolio, as well as operational control of the fund.96  Disaster was 
averted.  However, the systemic risk that an LTCM collapse presented to 
the broader financial system induced government officials, academics, 
and professionals in the financial community to reexamine the 
regulation of, and practices conducted by, hedge funds. 
In April 1999, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
(“President’s Group”) issued a report (“1999 Report”). 97  The principal 
policy concern arising from the LTCM episode was how to constrain 
excessive leverage.98  The President’s Group acknowledged, however, 
that the systemic risk posed by excessive leverage must be balanced 
with the benefits leverage confers on markets.99  The report notes that it 
would be difficult to place direct constraints on leverage because it is 
unreasonable to require a uniform degree of balance-sheet leverage for 
all investors, given their diverse exposures to risk and differences in 
their relationships to other market participants.100
 94. Id. 
 95. Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and 
Financial Servs., 105th Cong. 40 (1998) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), available at http://commdocs.hous 
e.gov/committees/bank/hba51526.000/hba51526_0f.htm. 
 96. 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at 13-14. 
 97. See generally id. 
 98. Id. at 29. 
 99. Id. at 23, 29 (noting that “leverage can play a positive role in our financial 
system, resulting in greater market liquidity, greater credit availability, and a more 
efficient allocation of resources in our economy”). 
 100. Id. at 24 (“For any given leverage ratio, the fragility of a portfolio depends on 
the market, credit, and liquidity risks in the portfolio.”)  Additionally, the group noted 
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The President’s Group further noted several problems with the risk 
management procedures practiced by LTCM and its counterparties.101  
Investment banks, which often extend credit to hedge funds, were in 
such fierce competition for LTCM’s business that they tended to offer 
the fund unusually relaxed financing terms.102  This led to lower 
standards in the extension of credit, or leverage, to LTCM, which then 
achieved extremely high levels of assets under management relative to 
its equity, which in turn exacerbated the liquidity problems the fund 
faced when it attempted to exit its positions in 1998.103
F.  The Hedge Fund Rule 
The SEC’s adoption of the “hedge fund rule” in December 2004104 
is an example of the government’s misguided focus regarding hedge 
fund regulation.  The rule required hedge fund advisers to register as 
investment advisers by February 1, 2006.105  Hedge fund advisers are 
now required to register because the definition of “client” was changed 
under the Adviser Act for purposes of the “private adviser 
exemption.”106
The SEC stated that “[t]he rule and rule amendments [we]re 
designed to provide the protections afforded by the Advisers Act to 
investors in hedge funds, and to enhance the Commission’s ability to 
protect [the] nation’s securities markets.”107  The SEC cited three 
reasons for the adoption of the rule.108  First, it noted the 260% increase 
in hedge fund assets from 1999 to 2004 and forecasts for the continued 
expansion of the hedge fund industry.109  Second, it stated that there had 
been “substantial and troubling growth in the number of . . . hedge fund 
fraud enforcement cases.”110  Finally, it expressed concern regarding the 
that a uniform standard for leverage constraints might induce fund managers to pursue 
riskier speculative trading strategies. Id. 
 101. See id. at B-7. 
 102. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 45-46. 
 103. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at 29. 
 104. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 39. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.; see also Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 109. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 39; Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877. 
 110. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 39 (noting that over the preceding five years, the 
SEC brought “51 cases in which [it] asserted that hedge fund advisers defrauded hedge 
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growing exposure of smaller investors and other market participants, 
both indirectly and directly, to hedge funds.111  The most significant area 
of increased exposure, according to the SEC, was the number of pension 
funds and endowments that were increasing their allocations to hedge 
funds.112  This increased exposure to risk through hedge funds means 
that “[l]osses resulting from hedge fund investing and hedge fund frauds 
may affect the entities’ ability to satisfy their obligations to their 
beneficiaries or pursue other intended purposes.”113
The SEC intended the rule to benefit hedge fund investors by 
deterring fraud and curtailing losses resulting from hedge fund adviser 
fraud.114  It would also benefit investors by disclosing basic information 
about hedge fund advisers.115  Perhaps most importantly, the rule was 
supposed to result in improved compliance controls at hedge funds.116  
The SEC also asserted that the change in registration requirements 
would benefit mutual fund investors by curtailing illegal conduct that 
exploits mutual funds.117
The new rule would provide a level playing field for hedge fund 
advisers by requiring that everyone register.118  The SEC also opined 
that registration of hedge fund advisers would “enhance investor 
confidence in a growing and maturing industry.”119  The SEC 
acknowledged that the rule would create certain costs for the hedge fund 
industry.120  Specifically, the rule would create registration costs and 
costs for establishing and maintaining a compliance infrastructure for 
each hedge fund.121
The hedge fund rule did not receive unanimous support.122  Two 
SEC Commissioners dissented, challenging factual predicates on which 
fund investors or used the fund to defraud others in amounts [exceeding] $1.1 billion”). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  There were some advisers who registered voluntarily before February 2006, 
who prior to the rule, were at a disadvantage to those who were not registered. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See generally Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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the rule was based and the wisdom of the rule.123  Phillip Goldstein, a 
hedge fund adviser, also challenged the rule,124 arguing that the SEC 
misinterpreted § 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act.125  In June 2006, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the hedge fund rule126 in 
Goldstein v. Securities & Exchange Commission, reasoning that it was 
too arbitrary.127  The court reasoned that the rule’s new definition of 
“client” strayed too far from the definition in the statute, and therefore 
went beyond Congress’ intent when it passed the Advisers Act.128  The 
SEC declined to appeal the ruling.129
G.  Investor Protections and the “Moral Hazard” 
The focus of the government in creating the hedge fund rule was 
misguided.  The rule was “designed to provide the protections afforded 
by the Advisers Act to investors in hedge funds.”130  While investor 
protection regulations are important, they do not adequately reduce 
systemic risk.131  In fact, the government’s new rule might have 
exacerbated the problem of systemic risk by creating a false sense of 
security, or “moral hazard,” in the financial community.132  A concern 
arose that investors might not conduct proper due diligence on funds in 
which they invested if they had a false sense of confidence in the 
regulatory scheme.133  For example, former Secretary of the Treasury 
John Snow stated that a “government promise to increase scrutiny would 
create ‘a real risk of moral hazard that implies, ‘Don’t worry.  Now the 
 123. Id. at 878. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 884. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. at 883-84. 
129.    Gretchen Morgenson & Jenny Anderson, A Hedge Fund’s Loss Rattles Nerves, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at C1.
 130. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 39. 
 131. Isaac Lustgarten, De Facto Regulation of Hedge Funds Through the Financial 
Services Industry and Protection Against Systemic Risk Posed by Hedge Funds, 26 No. 
10 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 1, 1-2 (2007). 
 132. See Craig Torres & Anthony Massucci, Bernanke Backs ‘Light’ Regulation of 
Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 12, 2007 (reporting Chairman Bernanke as 
saying that heavy regulation after the collapse of LTCM “would have increased moral 
hazard”). 
 133. See id. 
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government is watching over you and there aren’t any problems.’’”134  
Leading members of Congress have indicated that future hedge fund 
regulation will remain primarily focused on investor protection, such as 
fraud prevention.135
It seems the need to protect against the threat to liquidity from 
excessive leverage outweighs the need to protect against the threat to 
investors from adviser fraud.136  Even if the government focused on both 
liquidity and investor protection, additional regulation runs the risk of 
overreaching, reducing the flexibility of fund managers.137  Such 
regulation could reduce the overall advantages the hedge fund industry 
offers.138  Government regulation is too blunt an instrument for this 
complex problem. 
III.  A SOLUTION: PRIME BROKERS, SELF-REGULATION, 
AND “BEST PRACTICES” 
Self-regulation would most likely avoid the excessive and 
overbroad restrictions, thereby minimizing the impact on the benefits of 
the hedge fund industry.  Self-regulation could effectively address the 
potential systemic risks hedge funds pose to the world economy.  Self-
regulation by means of an intra-industry association of prime brokers 
would strike a proper balance with regard to risk management, credit 
evaluation, and leverage.  Section 15(a) of the ‘34 Act authorizes this 
 134. Kevin Carmichael, Cerberus’s Snow Says ‘Lighter’ Regulation Best for Hedge 
Funds, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 31, 2006. 
 135. See, e.g., Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators’ Ability to Respond to Threats 
to the Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th 
Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Barney Frank, Chairman, H. Comm. on Financial Servs.) 
(“We obviously have the concern about systemic risk . . . [a]nd I have been saying that 
it seemed to me less important than investor protection.”), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&doci 
d=f:39903.pdf. 
 136. See, e.g., 1999 REPORT, supra note 18 at ii (noting that “the principal policy 
issue arising out of the events surrounding the near collapse of LTCM is how to 
constrain excessive leverage . . . [and the resulting] likelihood of a general breakdown 
in the functioning of financial markets”). 
 137. See Carmichael, supra note 134. 
 138. See supra Part I; see, e.g., Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, supra note 4, 
at 1401 (noting that government “legislation will almost certainly fail to anticipate 
future trends”); David Enrich & Arden Dale, Hedge Fund, Regulate Thyself—Could 
Self-Policing Help Avoid More Government Oversight?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2006, at 
B4. 
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practice.139  It provides that “associations may register with the 
Commission pursuant to specified terms and conditions, and authorizes 
them to promulgate rules designed to prevent fraudulent and 
manipulative practices; to promote equitable principles of trade; to 
safeguard against unreasonable profits and charges; and generally to 
protect investors and the public interest.”140
Prime brokers, commonly a division of large investment banks, 
offer a “bundle of services” to hedge funds,141 including “providing 
intraday credit to facilitate foreign exchange payments and securities 
transactions; providing margin credit to finance purchases of equity 
securities; and borrowing securities from investment fund managers on 
behalf of hedge funds to support the hedge funds’ short positions.”142  
They also contribute clearance and custody services, securities lending, 
financing, technology services, and assistance with capital 
introductions.143  The role of prime brokers as counterparties in 
extending credit to finance funds’ leverage positions and as 
intermediaries in funds’ securities transactions place them in unique 
positions both to gather real-time information on the total levels of 
liquidity in the system and to limit the hedge funds’ ability to overextend 
themselves.144
At most large broker-dealers, the board of directors authorizes a 
credit management committee to determine risk management policies.145  
Credit departments that are independent of the business units that 
assume the credit risk execute these policies.146  In accordance with the 
general risk management guidelines set by the management committee, 
the credit department handles the credit approval process for hedge 
funds on behalf of the prime brokerage units.147
Evaluation of a new hedge fund client typically involves the 
examination of factors such as “character of management, credit history, 
 139. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006). 
 140. United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 700 n.6 
(1975). 
 141. 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at 17. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley, Prime Brokerage Services, http://www.morganstanle 
y.com/institutional/primebrokerage/index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
 144. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at 25. 
 145. Id. at B-7. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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financial performance, permanence of capital and access to additional 
capital, liquidity, asset quality, business integrity, experience of fund 
management, sensitivity to risk, use of leverage, back office operations, 
and mark-to-market procedures.”148  Evaluation of the fund’s risk 
exposure is determined by the liquidity of positions held and the 
potential amount of leverage employed based on the funds’ proposed 
investing strategy.149  Periodic reviews generally occur no less than once 
annually.150  If approved, hedge funds then receive internal credit 
ratings, which are continually adjusted and which establish the level of 
trading the funds may conduct and the level of collateral required.151
Hedge funds are not rated by credit agencies, but banks’ analysts 
typically use similar criteria to assess funds’ creditworthiness.152  Unlike 
public corporations, however, from which the SEC requires detailed 
disclosures,153 hedge funds typically provide less disclosure than public 
reporting companies or registered entities.154  Thus, their ratings are 
inherently based on more subjective factors, such as the experience and 
track record of the hedge fund and its managers.155
Once hedge funds are approved for credit and trading, 
counterparties such as prime brokers continually evaluate performance 
and may request additional collateral or limit their ability to leverage 
positions or execute certain trades.156  Thus, prime brokers, through their 
dual role as creditors and counterparties, are best positioned to limit 
hedge funds’ use of leverage.157  A self-regulatory body consisting of 
prime brokers would be able to use this position to reduce systemic risk 
and help maintain proper liquidity in markets. 
A.  “Prisoner’s Dilemma” and Self-Regulation 
The implementation of a “best practice” standard at prime 
brokerage firms must be backed by an independent, self-regulatory body 
 148. Id. at B-8. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ll (2006). 
 154. 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at B-9. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at B-10 to -11. 
 157. See id. at A-1. 
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that has the authority to levy significant sanctions against firms that fail 
to abide by the standards.158  This is because the brokerage market for 
hedge fund business generally behaves in a manner that, absent 
enforceable risk management standards, produces a situation similar to 
the classical game theory concept of a “prisoner’s dilemma.”  The 
prisoner’s dilemma describes a situation in which parties have complete 
information regarding the consequences of both their choices and their 
opponent’s choices, but, due to unilateral incentives to deviate from the 
optimal strategy, the parties end up with a suboptimal result.159
The situation confronting financial firms such as brokers resembles 
a prisoner’s dilemma.  The brokers as a group would be better off if each 
firm abided by mutually agreed-upon “best practice standards.”160  
Absent a regulatory framework, however, each brokerage firm has a 
unilateral incentive to deviate from the optimal “best practice” standards 
to overly lax risk management standards.161  A failure to do so would 
put the firm at a competitive market disadvantage.162  As a result, 
industry standards that are not regulated by a self-governing association 
will likely fail to impose the necessary changes in risk management 
procedures at prime brokerage units. 
The relations between LTCM and its counterparties exhibited the 
aforementioned behavior.  In that instance, Merrill Lynch, Morgan 
Stanley, JPMorgan, and “just about everyone else” waived their usual 
requirements for collateral on bond trades with LTCM.163  In fact, 
PaineWebber, who refused to relax its standards, got very little business 
from LTCM.164  Thus, while smaller firms such as PaineWebber escaped 
the damage of LTCM’s collapse, almost all of the major Wall Street 
firms, consistent with the behavior predicted by the prisoner’s dilemma, 
 158. See J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund 
Regulation, Part II, A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 818 (2007).
 159. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1997 (2007).
 160. See Philipp M. Hildebrand, Hedge Funds and Prime Broker Dealers: Steps 
Towards a “Best Practice Proposal,” FIN. STABILITY REV., April 2007, at 75, available 
at http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/rsf/2007/etud7_0407.pdf. 
 161. See Robert P. Sieland, Caveat Emptor! After All the Regulatory Hoopla, 
Securities Analysts Remain Conflicted on Wall Street, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 531, 548 
(2003).
 162. Id.
 163. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 45-46. 
 164. Id. at 46. 
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relaxed their credit standards in their relations with LTCM.165  Absent 
any additional regulatory controls, it is likely that financial firms will 
continue to exhibit this sort of behavior in the future. 
B.  Strengths and Limitations of Self-Regulation via Prime Brokers 
Prime brokers can best reduce the systemic threats posed by hedge 
funds because they would be able to keep proprietary trade secrets 
confidential while collecting the necessary information for credit 
evaluators to account for liquidity at risk.  As mentioned, hedge funds 
are largely opaque with regard to the release of information.166  Investors 
often have only limited access to their funds’ investment positions, and 
hedge fund advisors enjoy wide latitude to change their investment 
positions within broad guidelines.167  Through their roles as 
counterparties, prime brokers have significant access to hedge funds’ 
credit exposure.168  Even so, due to the multitude and complexity of 
trades hedge funds tend to make, a fund’s broker may not be fully aware 
of the fund’s exact trading positions, and consequently of the degree of 
risk present in its overall portfolio.169  A self-regulatory body of prime 
brokers could facilitate the collection of information needed to 
effectively assess the risk of a fund’s portfolio, and thereby allow the 
broker to limit leverage while preserving proprietary trade secrets. 
C.  Liquidity: Risks Mitigated by Self-Regulation by Prime Brokers 
Simply put, “market discipline failed [with] Long-Term Capital 
Management . . . .”170  Its reputation, initial success, and potential for 
fees led to intense competition among Wall Street investment banks for 
 165. The list of LTCM’s partners that participated in the Fed-orchestrated bailout of 
LTCM as a result of their own exposure included Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley 
Dean Witter, Merrill Lynch, Chase Manhattan, JPMorgan, Lehman Brothers, Salomon 
Smith Barney, and Bankers Trust. Id at xviii. 
 166. See Pearson & Pearson, supra note 23, at 26. 
 167. See Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, supra note 4, at 1400.  These broad 
guidelines are usually set out in a fund’s prospectus. Id. 
 168. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at B-4 n.21. 
 169. See, e.g., LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 155 (“Because none of [LTCM’s] 
banks had the whole picture, none saw that most of its trades were hedged and tended to 
offset one another . . . .”). 
 170. Torres & Massucci, supra note 132 (quoting Federal Reserve Board Chairman, 
Ben Bernanke). 
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LTCM’s business.171  As a result, the fund was able to command terms 
that led to a gradual deterioration of credit evaluation and risk 
management by the brokerages and banks with which it dealt.172  
Additionally, due to its size, LTCM dealt with many different 
brokerages and banks.173  As a result, no individual counterparty could 
assess “the depth of LTCM’s liquidity problems.”174  Essentially, each 
counterparty (or brokerage) had only a small snapshot of LTCM’s risk 
profile.  With such a limited picture it is doubtful the “counterparties 
were aware of the nature of the exposures and risks the hedge fund had 
accumulated, such as the [f]und’s exposure to market liquidity and 
funding liquidity risks.”175  Many bankers, when they arrived at 
LTCM’s Connecticut offices to inspect its books at the height of the 
fund’s troubles, were shocked to see the extent of its leverage and the 
volume of its trading positions.176
D.  Amaranth Advisors 
The hedge fund, Amaranth Advisors (“Amaranth”), is another 
example of the importance of risk management procedures in relation to 
prime brokers, and the importance of liquidity at risk to a fund’s 
ultimate success or failure.  Amaranth was a Connecticut-based hedge 
fund that suffered billions of dollars in losses within a matter of days in 
September 2006.177  Amaranth, like most funds, used leverage to 
increase its return on equity.178  It invested in natural gas futures 
contracts, a highly illiquid commodity.179  The particular positions 
Amaranth held in natural gas immediately prior to its fall are 
unknown.180  At one point, Amaranth was said to have entered into 
 171. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 45-46. 
 172. See id. at 46. 
 173. See id. 
 174. 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at 14. 
 175. Id. at 14-15. 
 176. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 169-70. 
 177. Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, supra note 4, at 1394. 
 178. See Lessons from Amaranth Helpful for Clients, INV. NEWS, Oct. 2, 2006, 
available at 2006 WLNR 17341763. 
 179. See Maggie Shea, Commodities Growth: The Good, the Bad and the Blowups, 
HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Feb. 14 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 2945725. 
 180. See Ludwig B. Chincarini, The Amaranth Debacle: A Failure of Risk Measures 
or a Failure of Risk Management? 2 (Apr. 5, 2007) (unpublished working paper), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952607. 
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contracts “representing more than 50% of the monthly demand for 
natural gas in the United States.”181  Some estimates indicate that at one 
point the fund held forty percent of the positions on the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”).182  Other experts concluded that 
Amaranth held up to eighty percent of the total open interest for natural 
gas futures on the NYMEX.183  Regardless of the actual percentage, 
Amaranth’s massive market share in natural gas futures contracts was a 
significant factor in its inability to liquidate its assets in the market.184  
When natural gas prices failed to drop as the fund’s head energy trader 
expected, Amaranth was forced to sell its portfolio to JPMorgan (its 
prime broker), and Citadel Investments (another large hedge fund).185
E.  Liquidity at Risk, Self-Regulation, and Prime Brokers 
Brokers for LTCM and Amaranth ultimately failed to account for 
liquidity risk when they extended leverage to the funds.186  Although 
“[m]odels for liquidity risk are not as common place as models for 
market risk,”187 financial firms have begun to improve their models for 
evaluating value at risk.188  Without information on the total trading 
levels, positions, and leverage of a fund, especially in relation to the 
total market, prime brokers and other counterparties are in danger of 
critically ignoring liquidity risk.189
Information regarding the total liquidity and trading levels in 
markets would allow brokers to establish certain warning levels 
regarding a hedge fund’s positions so as to allow the broker to limit 
 181. Complaint at 4, San Diego County Employees Ret. Ass’n v. Maounis, No. 07-
CV-2618 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2007). 
 182. See Press Release, Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 
Investigations Subcomm. Releases Levin-Coleman Report on Excessive Speculation in 
the Natural Gas Market (June 25, 2007), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm? 
Fuseaction=PressReleases.View&PressRelease_id=1493&Affiliation=R [hereinafter 
Levin-Coleman Report]. 
 183. Chincarini, supra note 180, at 25. 
 184. See id. at 28. 
 185. See id. at 2.  Experts concluded that Amaranth’s “fire sale” had an extremely 
adverse effect on natural gas prices in the United States in 2006. See Levin-Coleman 
Report, supra note 182. 
 186. See Chincarini, supra note 180, at 20, 28. 
 187. Id. at 23. 
 188. See id. at 23-24. 
 189. See id. at 25-26. 
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excessive leverage and the potentially disastrous liquidity problems that 
could follow.  A self-regulating body comprised of prime brokers could 
gather information on trading levels and positions, while establishing 
procedures to maintain the proprietary trading secrets of hedge funds. 
They could then consolidate and analyze this information to measure the 
total liquidity at risk.190  Credit evaluation committees are already 
separate from the business units within the bank that extends leverage,191 
and reasonable measures could be implemented to maintain the 
confidentiality of information within the credit management and/or risk 
management areas of financial firms.192
Fines or similar monetary penalties would be the easiest and most 
effective methods of enforcement.  Ultimately, the industry must 
develop standards and specific penalties for all infractions.  Whatever 
the penalty, it must be severe enough to overcome the collective action 
problem presented by the prisoner’s dilemma situation that currently 
exists among brokers.193  In other words, the penalty for an infraction, 
such as overextending leverage, must exceed the potential short-term 
gain a broker could realize by relaxing its credit terms.194
Undoubtedly some concerns may arise regarding the confidentiality 
of the information.195  The fear of losing business, however, gives 
 190. In the case of a fund that uses multiple prime brokers, the self-regulatory 
organization could either provide each prime broker with the necessary information to 
evaluate liquidity at risk, or evaluate a fund’s liquidity at risk at the self-regulatory level 
and then inform the broker if the fund’s risk profile exceeded acceptable standards. 
 191. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 18, at B-7. 
 192. A similar situation already exists with investment banks.  The banks are 
responsible for maintaining a “chinese wall,” the purpose of which is to prevent the 
flow of information between the investment banking and research divisions of the 
companies (in order to prevent certain conflicts of interest). See Lisa Smith, The 
Chinese Wall Protects Against Conflicts of Interest, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/analyst/090501.asp.  While the SEC and banks are 
constantly working to improve the systems currently in place, the self-regulatory 
measures set up by the banks have largely been successful. See, e.g., Analyzing the 
Analysts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 107th Cong. 
70-72 (2001) (statement of Laura S. Unger, Acting Chairman, Securities and Exchange 
Commission), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/107-25.pdf. 
 193. See supra Part III.A. 
 194. The short-term gains brokers receive by relaxing credit terms usually comes in 
the form of increased financing fees, either through increases in volume of lending, or 
in total clients. 
 195. See Regulation of Hedge Funds, supra note 3 (noting the need to protect 
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financial firms a strong incentive to maintain confidentiality, and a self-
regulatory body would be able to determine an appropriate level of 
punishment for such a breach.  Additionally, since the government could 
step in to regulate the hedge fund industry,196 a self-regulatory body has 
an incentive to maintain confidential information to avoid this 
alternative.  Self-regulation is the most promising way of preventing 
excessive government regulation by maintaining the necessary risk 
management controls to address the total liquidity problem.  “Any direct 
U.S. regulations restricting their flexibility will doubtless induce the 
more aggressive funds to emigrate from under [U.S.] jurisdiction.”197
F.  Public Relations and Recent Government Efforts 
In recent years, political pressure to further regulate the hedge fund 
industry has increased.198  Many factors have contributed to this trend: 
the fact that hedge funds are “open only to the rich;”199 the industry’s 
increased profile due to recent hedge fund failures; increased focus on 
the tax rate of “carried interest,” which makes up a large portion of fund 
managers’ pay;200 the industry’s rapid growth;201 and the rising level of 
investment in hedge funds by pension funds and endowments.202  Public 
opinion already helped push a tax bill through Congress that would more 
than double the taxes paid by fund managers on “carried interest.”203  
proprietary information of hedge fund traders). 
 196. See Editorial, Targeting Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2006, at A18; Bill 
McIntosh, Hedge Funds Work to Address Critics’ Concerns, HEDGEWORLD DAILY 
NEWS, Sept. 26, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 18905748. [hereinafter McIntosh, 
Critics’ Concerns].
 197. Fallen Star: The Testimony; Excerpts from Greenspan Remarks Before 
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at C3, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fu 
llpage.html?res=9B01E6DB1538F931A35753C1A96E958260. 
 198. See generally Targeting Hedge Funds, supra note 196, at A18; Matt Chambers, 
Fanning the Flames: An Influx of Hedge Funds is Making Energy Markets More 
Volatile Than Ever, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2006, at R6.
 199. See Targeting Hedge Funds, supra note 196, at A18. 
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Additionally, an increasing number of alternative asset management 
firms, such as hedge funds, have chosen to tap the capital markets by 
going public.204  Such moves have raised awareness of the high 
compensation hedge fund professionals earn.205  These factors will 
continue to place pressure on elected officials to increase regulation.  A 
self-regulatory body approved by the SEC has the potential to “prove a 
decent hedge of its own against more-intrusive alternatives.”206
Recent changes in state law also reflect the increased pressure to 
regulate.207  The California Department of Corporations (“CDC”), for 
example, recently announced its intention to eliminate a registration 
exemption for certain investment advisers.208  The proposed amendment 
essentially mirrors the SEC’s 2004 hedge fund rule by requiring any 
person who fits California’s definition of an “investment adviser” to 
register with the CDC.209  Essentially, the amendment would require 
registration of those hedge fund managers who are no longer subject to 
federal registration as a result of the Goldstein decision.210  This type of 
state action serves as a reminder that “[t]he hedge fund industry must be 
Taxes; House Democrats Offer Bill; Blackstone Shares Rise in IPO, WASH. POST, June 
23, 2007, at D01. 
 204. Becky Yerak, Citadel Hiring Points to IPO, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19, 2007, 
available at 2007 WLNR 18329808 (noting that “[a]lternative investment firms such as 
hedge funds and private-equity firms increasingly have been tapping public markets”).
 205. See Andrew Dolbeck, U.S. Legislators vs. Private Equity Firms, WKLY. CORP. 
GROWTH REP., July 23, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 14506913. 
 206. Targeting Hedge Funds, supra note 196.
 207. See generally J. Matthew Mangan & Alexandra C. Sparling, California 
Proposes Rule Change That Will Require Certain Hedge Fund Advisers to Register 
with the State and Proposes New Rules Affecting Licensed California Advisers 
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seen to be taking its responsibilities seriously . . . . If not, others will fill 
the vacuum.”211
G.  Self-Regulation and Legal Liability: Good for Brokers, Too 
The establishment of industry standards, or “best practices,” may be 
necessary for prime brokers to limit legal liability arising from their 
contractual obligations to hedge funds.  Amaranth,212 in addition to 
serving as a warning of the effects of poor risk management, also serves 
as a reminder that the absence of endorsed, standardized industry 
practices may leave participants vulnerable to liability without any 
affirmative defenses to claims of misconduct and fraudulent action.  In 
November 2007, Amaranth sued its broker, JPMorgan,213 alleging that 
JPMorgan’s refusal to clear a proposed trade of its energy portfolio to 
Goldman Sachs breached the two parties’ contract governing their 
trading relationship.214  The complaint also alleged that JPMorgan 
interfered with a proposed sale of the energy portfolio to the Chicago-
based hedge fund Citadel.215  Amaranth alleged that JPMorgan contacted 
Citadel after Citadel reached an agreement with Amaranth and informed 
it that Amaranth’s financial condition was worse than the fund had 
disclosed.216
Amaranth’s lawsuit raises important questions about the 
relationship between hedge funds and prime brokers.  While the lawsuit 
is still in its infancy, and its outcome is unclear, endorsed industry 
standards would nevertheless help protect the brokerage industry from 
future allegations by their hedge fund clients of tortious conduct.  Such 
standards would serve as guidelines for balancing brokers’ contractual 
obligations with their own self-interests.  More importantly, industry 
standards would guide brokers in balancing their contractual obligations 
to clients, while maintaining standards that help protect against 
unnecessary systemic risk.  If a situation similar to Amaranth’s arises in 
 211. McIntosh, Critics’ Concerns, supra note 196.
 212. See supra Part II. 
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the future, a prime broker should not have to choose between breaking 
its obligations to clients and unnecessarily increasing its risk.  A self-
regulatory body would help brokers to achieve the proper balance of 
those interests. 
 
H.  Future Trends in the Industry 
Recent developments suggest that investment banks that serve as 
prime brokers to hedge funds have begun to move toward establishing 
self-regulatory frameworks to govern their dealings with advisers, 
showing that they may be receptive to the establishment of a self-
regulatory body.  Morgan Stanley, one of the world’s leading providers 
of prime brokerage services,217 recently launched LiquidFunds, a hedge 
fund platform designed to enhance liquidity and transparency for 
institutional investors.218  According to one of the program’s managing 
directors, “[t]he LiquidFunds program will help people overcome th[eir] 
reluctance [in investing] by delivering an alternative range of hedge 
funds that provide the liquidity and transparency that investors demand, 
within a self-regulatory regime.”219  Each participating fund must 
undergo a three-stage due diligence process prior to enrollment in the 
program.220  Greenwich Alternative Investments (“GAI”) administers 
the due diligence process.221  “In the initial screening stage, each 
prospective manager is screened against static criteria for track record, 
minimum assets under management and performance.”222  In the second 
stage, GAI conducts an on-site visit with the investment manager 
culminating in an assessment of the investment strategy.223  The third 
stage involves an ongoing assessment of the fund through monthly 
reviews of its performance.224
 217. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Top Prime Broker, HEDGE FUND DAILY, Oct. 24, 
2007, http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article.aspx?articleID=1533465 (reporting 
that Alpha magazine named Morgan Stanley best overall prime brokerage for the third 
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Funds participating in the program must comply with specific 
investment guidelines.225  Investors have the option to buy and sell their 
hedge fund positions on a weekly basis.226  The funds must adopt 
common corporate governance standards and must issue daily risk 
reports.227  The reports must include an “assessment of whether each 
fund is in compliance with the program’s investment guidelines.”228  
Additionally, Morgan Stanley has retained a risk analytics provider, 
GlobeOp Risk Services Ltd.,229 to provide “sensitivity, scenario, stress, 
and [value at risk] analysis . . . .”230
The launch of programs like LiquidFunds represents a positive step 
by the industry to improve risk management procedures, but more needs 
to be done.  The program’s scope is limited, as it only governs funds that 
choose to enroll.  It therefore fails to adequately address liquidity 
problems and systemic risk.  While such programs are a step in the right 
direction, they should not be the end goal of the industry.  Nevertheless, 
the hedge fund industry’s movement toward self-regulatory standards on 
a firmwide level provides hope for the success of a proposal to impose 
self-regulatory standards on the entire industry. 
I.  The Limitations of Self-Regulation via Prime Brokers 
An association of brokers that imposes penalties on its members for 
failure to follow certain standards must avoid the risk of imposing limits 
on leverage that are too strict, such as prematurely withholding credit or 
ceasing to execute a fund’s trades.231  For example, if a fund used new 
trading strategies or traded in a new type of security, a broker’s model 
for credit evaluation could exaggerate the actual risk inherent in the 
fund’s portfolio.  Prematurely withholding leverage would result in a 
situation similar to that preceding the collapse of Amaranth and LTCM, 
forcing a fund to sell its assets for less than their true market value. 
Despite this concern, the benefits of self-regulatory limits on 
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leverage outweigh these potential dangers.  Uniform standards, strictly 
enforced across the industry, would provide advance warning of funds 
that are approaching hazardous levels of leverage.  Additionally, on 
average, a hedge fund is only leveraged at around twice its asset base.232  
Restrictions and standards governing leverage and liquidity risk should 
only be used in extreme situations (like an Amaranth or LTCM) and 
should not impair the vast majority of funds. 
Ultimately, an environment that allows the vast majority of funds to 
operate unimpaired and to maintain total liquidity, thereby drastically 
reducing systemic risk, would be the most beneficial to the hedge fund 
industry, brokerages, and the investing public. 
CONCLUSION 
Hedge funds benefit the economy in many ways, but they also 
present many risk management challenges for the funds, the brokers, and 
the market as a whole.  Maintaining benefits while limiting risks 
requires a balance among many interests.  Current regulations fail to 
achieve this balance because they inadequately reduce systemic risk.  
Recent attempts by both federal and state governments have also failed 
to address this risk, and future government regulation may impose 
unnecessarily broad rules that would limit the benefits of hedge funds.  
Self-regulation at the broker level can properly balance hedge funds’ 
risks and benefits by quickly evaluating current market conditions and 
adjusting accordingly.  This regulation must be supported by an 
organization with the authority to impose penalties for non-compliance, 
neutralizing participating firms’ incentives to unilaterally deviate from 
industry standards.  An association of brokers offers numerous 
advantages to the participating parties, and is likely to find support in the 
hedge fund industry.
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